A striking feature of an United States election campaign focused on the supposed ills of globalization is how little attention is being drawn to Germany’s extremely big external existing account surplus. This is even more surprising thinking about how much bigger are Germany’s external imbalances in relation to those of China.
While the IMF now approximates that China’s external current account surplus might be some 1 to 3 percent of GDP above a suitable level, it estimates that Germany’s is some 3 to 6 percent of GDP expensive. Similarly while the IMF thinks about that after years of gratitude China’s currency exchange rate is now roughly at a suitable level, it thinks about that the currency exchange rate Germany deals with is now in between 10 and 20 percent too low for that nation.
That Germany is running a disturbingly large external imbalance for the world economy is barely open to question. According to the most current main balance of payments data, Germany’s external present account deficit rose to the highest level on record. It is now on track to stay above 8.5 percent of gdp for the year as a whole, which would be around 3 times the size of China’s present account surplus. Making this surplus all the more uncomfortable is the fact that it is happening at a time when the German economy is cyclically in a quite more powerful position than its European partners.
Germany’s maintenance of a bank account surplus as big as that it now has would be harming to both the international and the European economies. From an international point of view, at a time that there is inadequate worldwide aggregate demand, a big German current account surplus makes up a drain on aggregate demand in the remainder of the world. Similarly, from an European viewpoint, at a time that nations in the European periphery are being required to stabilize their economies, the maintenance of a large German bank account surplus makes that rebalancing all the more difficult.
While US experts are now coming to focus their attention on Germany’s large external imbalance, as is the United States Treasury in its newest currency report to Congress, the options that they are proposing to redress this imbalance are partial at finest. Such options range from requiring of Germany to undertake a higher degree of public infrastructure spending to improve financial investment or having the German federal government encourage higher salaries from the business sector to enhance consumption and to make the nation less competitive.
The reality of the matter is that the extremely size of the German external imbalance makes it necessary to ponder a comprehensive method if a considerable decrease is to be made because imbalance. Undoubtedly, in much the exact same way as the IMF would prescribe a detailed method for a country to redress a large external bank account deficit, so too would an extensive technique, albeit in reverse, be suggested for a nation with a large external bank account surplus.
2 essential components would be needed in such an approach. The very first would be to require a significant gratitude of the currency facing German exporters and importers. Such an appreciation would be required both to change resources away from Germany’s traded excellent sector along with to minimize domestic cost savings by efficiently increasing the real wage level through reducing the price of imports. The 2nd aspect would be to substantially loosen German residential fiscal and monetary policies to enhance residential need to make up for the decreased assistance to the domestic economy from the external sector.
Regretfully, so long as Germany remains tied to the Euro, there is little prospect that it will be faced with a more powerful currency anytime soon. Certainly, with US and European monetary policies now out of sync and with the total European economy still struggling, there is every possibility that the Euro will continue to depreciate. If that were to occur, there is every likelihood that Germany’s external imbalance would just increase.
It would seem that the only manner in which Germany can get a quite more valued currency would be if it were to exit the Euro. To be sure, such a move would represent a fundamental departure from present policy. However, if that move is not undertaken, the world must reconcile itself to a large German external bank account imbalance for a protracted amount of time. On the other hand nations in the European periphery should brace themselves for continued difficult sledding in their efforts to reduce their economic imbalances.